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A traditional problem with the performative hypothesis is that it
cannot assign proper truth-conditions to a declarative sentence.
This paper shows that the problem is solved by adopting a mul-
tidimensional semantics on which sentences have more than just
truth-conditions. This is good news for those who want to at
least partially revive the hypothesis. The solution also brings into
focus a lesson about what issues to consider when drawing the
semantics/pragmatics boundary.
1 The performative hypothesis
The performative hypothesis or ph holds that every declarative represents the
speaker, the addressee, and how the speaker is related to the declarative’s truth-
conditional content (Ross 1970; Schreiber 1972; Sadock 1974). Let us reserve
the preface to name this syntactic representation. Declaratives like (1), which
do not overtly display the preface, were analyzed as being syntactically and
semantically equivalent to declaratives like (2) that did. The only meaningful
dierence between (1) and (2) is that the preface is elided in (1).
(1) Robin drank tea.
(2) I predict to you that Robin drank tea.
What ph oered was a grammatical explanation for what a speaker does with a
sentence. That (1) is a prediction is not owed to a constellation of extra-semantic
facts about conventions, norms, and/or the psychological states of participants.
It is owed to themeaning of the covert preface. That covert preface indicates that
the speaker is predicting that Robin drank tea to the addressee. If (1) performed
another act like an assertion, it would also be because the preface indicated as
much.
ph did not initially age well. It faced syntactic and semantic problems alike.
And yet a partial resurgence is underway. In syntactic corners, it is increasingly
common to theorize that the syntax of a sentence represents some if not all of the
components of a speech act (Ernst 2002; Speas and Tenny 2003; Haegeman and
Hill 2014; Wiltschko and Heim 2016). To pick one example, Speas and Tenny
(2003) take there to be a preface that represents the speaker, the addressee, and a
body of information that is indexed either to the speaker or the addressee. Note
that these three components are not sucient for individuating some speech acts.
Both conjectures and assertions, for instance, involve a speaker, addressee, and
body of information. But the three components are still enough to distinguish
between some acts. A question, according to Speas and Tenny, indexes the body
of information to the addressee whereas acts like assertions or guesses index the
body of information to the speaker. So who the body of information is indexed
to will at least coarsely settle what is being done with the sentence.
The renewed versions of ph diers in how preface’s syntax is understood.
On the old view, the preface was a lexical projection hosting a performative verb
alongside rst and second-person pronouns. The new view regards the preface
as a functional projection that does not correspond to any lexical items. Such a
dierence enables the revived ph to avoid many of the syntactic problems that
initially aicted ph.
However, renewed attention has not been directed to solving ph’s semantic
problems. This oversight is surprising. Partial versions of ph can also be found
in semantic corners. For example, many hypothesize that declaratives host a
preface indicating that the speaker is asserting the truth-conditional content
(Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Chierchia 2006; Alonso-Ovalle andMenéndez-
Benito 2010; Hacquard 2006, 2010; Meyer 2013, 2014). The motivation for
hypothesizing as much is often the same. A linguistic phenomenon is being
explained that is easier to account for in an embedded environment than in an
unembedded environment. To ease explanation, the unembedded is assimilated
to the embedded by positing an assertoric preface. But none tackle the semantic
problems of ph.
The most prominent is what I call the truth-condition problem (Cohen
1964; Lycan and Boër 1980). The problem can be framed in a few ways.
Here’s my preferred framing. The preface takes wide-scope to make a semantic
contribution to a declarative. It can be thought of as a function from a truth-
conditional content—what I call the prejacent—to a performative content.
Assuming that the semantic contribution made by the preface is to a sentence’s
truth-conditions, the truth-conditions of a declarative are determined by the
prejacent alone or they are determined by the performative content. Those are
the options. But neither delivers the proper truth-conditions. Suppose (2) is
true if (1) is. That supposition leads to disaster. We can easily imagine a solitary
individual silently drinking tea. In our imagined scenario, (1) is true but (2) is
not because no speech act is performed with an addressee. Alternatively, suppose
(1) is true if (2) is true. The trouble returns. We can easily imagine a speaker
uttering (1) to an addressee with no tea nearby in a world where Robin never has
and never will drink tea. In our imagined scenario, (2) is true when (1) is not.
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Regardless of how one understands the syntax of the preface, the truth-
condition problem will persist. The representation of the speaker, addressee,
and the way the speaker is related to an underlying content still contribute
to the meaning of a declarative. To deny as much is to deny a key tenet
of contemporary syntax according to which every element is semantically
interpreted (Chomsky 1995). Even if we give up the assumption that the preface
can only make a semantic contribution by inuencing a declarative’s truth-
conditions, what kind of contribution the preface makes remains to be specied
if the hypothesis can be revived.
Fortunately, new and old versions of ph alike can straightforwardly solve the
truth-condition problem by adopting a multidimensional semantics. Or so I will
argue in this paper. This is good news for linguists and philosophers wanting to
partially or fully revive ph. It is also instructive. Even if one has no interest in re-
viving ph, the multidimensional solution to the truth-condition problem enables
a new lesson about how to understand the semantics/pragmatics boundary.
2 Multidimensionality
A semantic theory is multidimensional when it assigns multiple contents to a
sentence. I adopt the theory of Gutzmann (2015) on which sentences carry
two contents: truth-conditional and use-conditional content.1 While truth-
conditional content can be represented as a set of worlds that is true when
the actual world is among them, use-conditional content can be represented—
following unpublished work by Kaplan (2004)—as a set of contexts that is
felicitous when the context of use is an element. Within such a theory, an
expression can contribute only to truth-conditions, to use-conditions but not
truth-conditions, or to both contents.
Expressions thought to require a multidimensional semantics include slurs,
honorics, evidentials, vocatives, modal particles, and parenthetical verbs (Ka-
plan 2004; Potts 2004; McCready 2010; Gutzmann 2015; Kirk-Giannini
2019; van Elswyk forthcoming). On a multidimensional approach to slurs,
for example, terms like Redneck contribute both to truth-conditions and use-
conditions. At the level of truth-conditions, redneck contributes information
about the socioeconomic status of an individual. But derogatory content is
contributed at the level of use-conditions.
A solution to the truth-condition problem readily presents itself when
theorizing within amultidimensional semantics. The preface receives ameaning
1 Nothing hangs on this choice. The solution only requires a multidimensional semantics
with compositional interaction between the dimensions. As such, one could treat the preface
as contributing a conventional implicature as opposed to use-conditional content (Potts 2004;
McCready 2010).
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where it only contributes to use-conditions. The truth-conditions of a sentence
are therefore determined by the prejacent. As such, the preface makes zero
contribution to a sentence’s truth-conditions. But this is not because it does
not make a semantic contribution. It makes a contribution to use-conditions
by introducing a secondary content that the speaker is presenting the primary
content in a particular way to the addressee of the context. The truth-condition
problem is solved because the preface is a function to a content in another
dimension altogether.
That’s the solution in brief. Let’s move more slowly and see the solution
with the machinery of Ltu, a logic owed to Gutzmann (2015). The semantic
value of an expression is three-dimensional in Ltu. There is a dimension
for truth-conditional content (t), a dimension for use-conditional content (u),
and third dimension that facilitates semantic composition between the previous











The t-dimension and the s-dimension are separated by ‘⧫’ while the s-dimension
and u-dimension are separated by ‘●.’
On the solution proposed, the preface receives such a three-dimensional
meaning. Where P is the preface, the meaning that avoids the truth-condition
problem is (4).
(4) JPKc = λp.p ⧫ λp.{c ∣ R(cS)(cA)(p)}
Consider the t-dimension. λp.p is an identity function that passes the prejacent
along unadulterated. As a result, no change is made to the truth-conditions.
Where the preface makes its contribution is in the next dimension. Within Ltu,
ordinary expressions have duplicate content in the t-dimension and s-dimension
(Gutzmann 2015, §4.4). So the same proposition that was passed along in the
t-dimension composes with λp.{c ∣ R(cS)(cA)(p)} in the s-dimension. Here R is
a triadic relation that indicates the illocutionary manner in which the speaker
of the context (cS) is presenting a truth-conditional content (p) to the addressee
of the context (cA). What the s-dimension of the preface therefore contains is a
function from a truth-conditional content to a use-conditional content.2
To illustrate, suppose the speaker and addressee are about to watch footage
of Robin from earlier. Before they do, the speaker utters Robin drank tea as a
2 There is nothing in the u-dimension of P because there is not yet a fully saturated use-
conditional content. Once the preface composes with a truth-conditional content in the s-
dimension, it will be moved to the u-dimension according to use-conditional elimination, a
composition rule in Ltu.
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prediction of what they are about to see. According to ph, that sentence hosts
a preface indicating that the utterance is a prediction. Implementing ph in
a multidimensional semantics would yield an entry like the following for that
preface:
(5) JPKc = λp.p ⧫ λp.{c ∣ predict(cS)(cA)(p)}
Treating a proposition as set of worlds, the prejacent in Robin drank tea is {w ∣
Robin drank tea in w)}. When the prejacent composes with the preface, (6) is
produced:
(6) {w ∣Robin drank tea inw)} ⧫ {c ∣ predict(cS)(cA)({w ∣Robin drank
tea in w)})}
Nothing happens in the t-dimension. However, a fully saturated use-conditional
content is formed in the s-dimension. That secondary content for the sentence
Robin drank tea states that the speaker is issuing a prediction to the addressee that
Robin drank tea.3
With the newer versions of ph on which the preface is a functional projection,
one can hypothesize that the use-conditional meaning is hard-wired into the
preface. With the old version, the problem is still solved with amultidimensional
semantics albeit with an extra step. The source of the truth-condition problem
for ph was analyzing (1) and (2) as being semantically equivalent. If a preface
like I predict to you that contributes to truth-conditions, ph runs aground on the
obvious fact that (1) and (2) have dierent truth-conditions. If it contributes
to use-conditions, the problem is avoided. But stipulating that I predict to you
that contributes only to use-conditions is a non-starter. The verb and rst and
second-person pronouns ordinarily have truth-conditional meanings.
Once again, a multidimensional semantics helps. Following van Elswyk
(forthcoming), we can introduce ‘⊗,’ a dimension shifter that lives in the
functional projection. It belongs to the family of shunting operators that are
standard to multidimensional theories that facilitate compositional interaction
between dimensions (McCready 2010; Gutzmann 2015). Two important jobs
are performed by ⊗: it erases an expression’s truth-conditional content in the
3 A choice-point for ph is elaborating how a sentence hosts a specic performative verb. Above
I’ve schematically represented the verb with R as a placeholder and replaced it with predict in
my illustration. One elaboration is that declaratives are ambiguous. There are then as many
disambiguations for each and every declarative as there are possible prefaces. Another option
is to interpret R as a context-sensitive variable as opposed to a placeholder. On this option,
the preface would indicate that the speaker is R-ly presenting the truth-conditional content to
the addressee but what value R has would depend on context. This second option is clearly
preferable. With it, what a speaker does with a sentence is not entirely determined by the
grammar. It would be determined by the grammar in context. As a result, what a speaker does
with a sentence would partly be a matter of metasemantics in the sense of Kaplan (1989).
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t-dimension and introduces unsaturated use-conditional content into the s-
dimension. In this way, it converts an expression that ordinarily contributes only
to truth-conditions to one that contributes only to use-conditions. The operator
is detailed below. Where E is a variable for the preface, ⊗ has this semantics.
(7) J⊗Kc = λE .T ⧫ λE .λp.{c ∣ cw ∈ Ep}
Above, T stands for the set of all worlds. So at the the truth-conditional level, ⊗
erases an expression’s truth-conditional content as a subset of worlds by sending
it to the set of all worlds. At the use-conditional level, ⊗ forms a use-conditional
content stating that the individuals specied are related in the way indicated by
the preface to a truth-conditional content. In short, (7) composes with a preface
to produce (4).
An example will clarify what ⊗ does. A preface on the original version of
ph consists of rst and second-person subjects and a performative verb like the
phrase I predict to you that. We can represent that as (8). It is a function from
a truth-conditional content p to another truth-conditional where the speaker
predicts p to the addressee.
(8) JI predict to you thatKc = λp.{w ∣ predict(cS)(cA)(p) in w} ⧫ λp.{w
∣ predict(cS)(cA)(p) in w}
As mentioned earlier, Ltu duplicates what happens in the t-dimension and s-
dimensions for ordinary expressions. When (8) composes with⊗, the dimension
shifter, dierent results are produced across the semantic dimensions.
(9) T ⧫ λp.{c ∣ cw ∈ {w ∣ predict(cS)(cA)(p) in w}}
The t-dimension erases the content of the preface. In the s-dimension, the pref-
ace becomes a function from a truth-conditional content p to a use-conditional
content. That use-conditional content states that the world of the context (cw) is
an element of the truth-conditional content holding that the speaker asserts p to
the addressee. Such a content is just a roundabout version of the use-conditional
content in (5).
What we are left with is just one meaning for each constituent in I predict
to you that that can be dimension shifted to produce a use-conditional meaning.
We can accept that an expression like I predict to you that sometimes contributes
to truth-conditions and sometimes contribute to use-conditions without positing
lexical ambiguity.4 Though there are still syntactic problems with the original ph
that revived versions lack, the ability to introduce an operator like ⊗ showcases
what can be achieved within a multidimensional semantics.
4 My proposals have commonalities with the view of sentence mood found in Gutzmann
(2015, §5) and the view of parenthetical verbs found in van Elswyk (forthcoming). But
there are important syntactic and semantic dierences. On the current proposal, the use-
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3 Retaining explanatoriness
ph was introduced to explain a wide variety of data. Does going multidimen-
sional interfere with such explanations? It does not. Space does not permit
consideration of every line of data. Still, let’s consider speech act adverbs or
sa-adverbs like frankly and truthfully for the purpose of illustration. An initial
reason for adopting ph that is also a reason for reviving it is that the hypothesis
can explain what sa-adverbs modify (Schreiber 1972; Ernst 2002). Compare
(10) and (11) and attempt with (11) to interpret frankly as modifying the past
tensed verb drank.
(10) Frankly, Robin drank tea.
(11) # Robin frankly drank tea.
(12) I frankly assert to you that Robin drank tea.
The two dier clearly dier. (10) is intelligible but (11) is not because drinking
is not an activity that can be done frankly. Given ph, what explains why (10)
alone is intelligible is that frankly modies the performative verb. Accordingly,
(10) can be paraphrased as (12). Asserting, saying, and the like are activities that
can be conducted frankly.
Such an explanation of sa-adverbs is unaected by regarding the preface
as contributing to use-conditions. A minor adjustment is required, however.
The sa-adverbs must also be understood as contributing to use-conditions as
opposed to truth-conditions. A sentence like (10) therefore carries two contents.
It carries a truth-conditional content specifying that Robin drank tea, and a use-
conditional content specifying that the speaker frankly asserted to the addressee
that Robin drank tea.
The minor adjustment carries an extra advantage. sa-adverbs do not
intuitively contribute to truth-conditions. Consider disagreeing responses to
(10) like That’s false or No, I don’t think so. What these indicate disagreement
with is that Robin drank tea. They do not communicate disagreement about
the speaker being frank. Going multidimensional enables an explanation of this
feature of sa-adverbs. Disagreement targets the truth-conditional content of a
sentence. Since sa-adverbs contribute to use-conditions, they cannot be targeted
for disagreement.
conditional meaning is not owed to a mood morpheme but the preface, which is a distinct
lexical or functional projection depending on the version of ph. That preface does not occupy a
parenthetical position either. Semantically, R can also take as many values as there are speech
acts that can be performed by using a declarative. See fn. 3 for related discussion. The best
grammatical explanation of what speakers do with a sentence may be provided by these other
proposals. However, assessing as much is not the aim of the present paper.
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4 Assertion operators
So far, I’ve discussed the multidimensional solution to the truth-condition
problem generally. Assertion operators are the most commonly theorized
preface. Accordingly, let’s give them a closer look. I illustrate with the
operator proposed by Meyer (2013, 2014). Meyer is compelled to posit an
assertion operator in developing a grammatical explanation of implicatures.
With grammatical explanations, the generation of implicatures is partially owed
to an exhaustication operator or Exh in the logical form of a sentence. In
positing an assertion operator or A, Meyer is able to derive a variety of dierent
implicatures. For example, a sentence like (13) generates either an uncertainty
or a scalar implicature. An uncertainty implicature indicates that the speaker
does not know whether Robin drank all of the tea (i.e. ¬Kall) whereas a scalar
implicature species that the speaker does know that Robin did not drink all of
the tea (i.e. K¬all).
(13) Robin drank some of the tea.
The exact details of her proposal do not concern us. What does is that Meyer
takes this implicature dierence to trace back to the scope of A and Exh. She
adopts the common assumption that assertions require or mandate speaker
knowledge in what is asserted. As such, the uncertainty implicature is allegedly
conveyed when Exh outscopes A in logical form, and the scalar implicature is
generated when A outscopes Exh.
But A is liable to inherit the truth-condition problem. Meyer does not say
much about its semantics. But if its semantic contribution is to a sentence’s truth-
conditions, (13) will state that the speaker asserts that Robin drank some of the
tea, which, given her knowledge-based understanding of assertion, is tantamount
to stating that the speaker knows that Robin drank of some of the tea. And yet,
(13) states no such thing.
Going multidimensional prevents the problem from surfacing. If A con-
tributes to use-conditions, Meyer’s proposal won’t assign the wrong truth-
conditions to (13).5 The requirement imposed by A that the speaker knows
the truth-conditional content will happen at the level of use-conditions as (14)
illustrates.
(14) JAKc = λp.p ⧫ λp.{c ∣ K(cS)(p)}
The operator above diers from the schematic proposal in (4) with what is in its
s-dimension. It is a function from a proposition to a set of contexts in which the
5 Given thatA requires speaker knowledge, Meyer’s proposal is very similar to parentheticalism,
the view that declaratives host a covert know-parenthetical. See van Elswyk (forthcoming, §6)
for discussion.
8
speaker of the context knows that proposition. For the use-conditional content
of a sentence to then be felicitous, (14) requires the speaker to know its truth-
conditional content.
Importantly, going multidimensional does not interfere with the initial
purpose for which A was theorized. There is nothing about the role played
by the scopal interaction between A and Exh in explaining implicatures that
requires that interaction to happen at the level of truth-conditions. Moving that
interaction to another semantic dimension, as the multidimensional version of
ph requires, just makes the implicature content use-conditional as opposed to
truth-conditional in nature.6
I cannot promise that every assertion operator that has been posited can
smoothly be plugged into a multidimensional semantics. The devil is in the
details. But the preceding discussion provides an apt illustration of how going
multidimensional can solve the truth-condition problem for a contemporary
version of ph without interfering with the theoretical purpose for which the
hypothesis was revived.
5 The semantics/pragmatics boundary
I conclude that the truth-condition problem for ph can be solved by adopting
a multidimensional semantics and proposing that the preface contributes to a
dimension of a sentence’s meaning dierent from its truth-conditions. What
the solution illustrates is that the problem was not ultimately with a grammatical
explanation of what a sentence does, but a problem with implementing such
an explanation in a unidimensional semantics. This is good news for those
who want to at least partially revive ph with assertion operators and similar
posits. Their operators need not inherit the truth-condition problem if its
meaning is spread across many dimensions. Accordingly, I recommend they
go multidimensional.
There is another lesson to be had, a lesson of broader interest. The boundary
between the meaning of a sentence and what a speaker does with that sentence is
a classic border dispute between semantics and pragmatics. Philosophers almost
without exception take an explanation of what a speaker does with a sentence
to be the domain of pragmatics. Thus the need for a theory of speech acts to
supplement a theory of grammar by appealing to conventions, norms, and/or
the psychological states of conversational participants. But one has to wonder
6 This dierence is also not as philosophically important as it may seem. As noted in fn. 1,
the choice to use Ltu is unimportant. Were we working in a logic like that found in McCready
(2010), the implicatures would just become conventional implicatures. Even sticking with Ltu,
use-conditional content can be converted to truth-conditional content (Kaplan 2004; Gutzmann
2015).
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howmuch this traditional demarcation is owed to philosophers theorizing almost
exclusively within a unidimensional semantics. I suspect much of it is, and
that is understandable. The truth-condition problem or variants thereof will
surface whenever one attempts to turn to the grammar for an explanation of
what speakers do with a sentence. But the problem can be put to rest with
a multidimensional semantics. Readers uninterested in reviving ph should
therefore reconsider how to draw the semantics/pragmatics boundary once a
multidimensional theory is in the mix. Maybe more is explained by what is in
another semantic dimension instead of what is not in the semantics.
In particular, speech act theorizing commonly individuates acts according
to conditions needed for the sincere performance of those acts (Austin 1962;
Searle 1969). Assertion is standardly thought to require knowledge or belief,
for example. In explaining the source of such conditions, the lesson to learn
is that appealing to conventions, norms, and/or the psychological states of
conversational participants is not mandatory. At least, the truth-condition
problem does not make that appeal mandatory. The lesson of this paper is that
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